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Abstract
Observations from two car projects are analysed. Video-recordings of two
sequences showing team  members trying to use confrontation to make other
members change their behaviour and pay more attention to the provision of
current information on release status to colleagues. The problem is formulated
against a background of decision quality and creativity which are assumed to
improve with “programmed conflict”. Such a conflict is present almost by design
when representatives of Production Control participate in decisions on design
changes in late stages of the product development process. It is found that
confrontation seems to be inconclusive, arguments in general in the observed
projects seemed to be incomplete. This is probably because several con-texts are
mobilised when members of different specialities interpret what is meant by an
argument. An alternative approach to analysis using a modernised version of
Speech Act theory (Cooren 2000) is used. A new kind of polyphony is indicated.
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Introduction
Organizations have many stabilisers, learning is one of them (Hedberg and
Jönsson 1978). It is generally considered that conflict is detrimental to creativity
while debate is good. Psychologist have made experiments to see if ”programmed
conflict” improves the quality of decisions, whether participants have been
stimulated to learn (which is often defined as ”critical evaluation of one’s own
assumptions” (Schweiger et al 1989)), and whether participants are willing to
continue to work together with the other members of the group. Ekvall and co-
workers (1983) have developed an instrument to measure work climate. In it they
differentiate two types of tensions between people, emotional and intellectual. In
the first case the two dislike each other, hurt each other, and show aggressiveness.
In the other there are different opinions and there is debate without negative hate-
like feelings. In practical life those types are not so easy to distinguish, but the
working hypothesis has been that the more emotionally loaded, the more
aggressive, a confrontation is the more the depressing effect on creativity.
Intellectual tensions, on the other hand provides a hotbed for creativity (Ekvall et
al 1987). Sometimes Ekvall has found that ”Conflict” comes out as a bipolar factor
with ”trust” on the other end of the scale (Ekvall 1991). The derivation of the
”Conflict” dimension in this case (Ekvall 1990) is an interesting story that will be
useful later: Inspired by the results achieved by Litwin & Stringer (1967) Ekvall’s
group developed an instrument of measurement as a first step in their studies of
what constitutes a creative organisation climate. A problem that arose was the fact
that “Debate” (To what extent there are confrontations and collisions between
viewpoints, ideas, different experiences and special knowledge) did not have the
expected discriminating power between stagnating and creative organisations. A
closer examination revealed that respondents had difficulties distinguishing
between confrontation of ideas and personal conflicts. Lively debates have
ingredients of both. Differences of opinion based in differences in experience and
knowledge easily turns personal. The solution was to add a set of distinct personal
conflict questions (“There are intrigues here”, ”Here some people cannot stand
each other”) to form a new scale (Personal conflicts). This lead to the debate-
variable showing better discrimination between innovative (more debate) and
stagnating (less debate) organisational units, but still the ”personal conflict”
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variable did not show the opposite pattern as expected. For some innovative
organisations personal conflict was higher than for stagnating ones. Ekvall (1990,
p. 28) chose to claim that in such organisations innovation happen ”in spite of”
personal conflict (which might be a reasonable statement if the debate variable is
high as well).
Debate as the therapy to foster creativity has been a centre piece of our
understanding of creativity ever since Janis (1972) studies of how well integrated
management teams could arrive and spectacularly unwise decisions (like ”Bay of
Pigs”). Focus in some parts of psychology has been on how the mechanisms that
lead to ”group think” can be prevented from generating their distorting effects
(c.f. Mason & Mitroff 1981, Mitroff 1987), while other parts, in the spirit of
Moscovici (Moscovici and Doise 1994) focus on team building. Brunsson (1985 and
1989) shows that bias or even hypocrisy related to team loyalty can be a
managerial instrument to generate successful action.
Schweiger et al (1989) designed an experiment on ”programmed conflict” with
managers as participants to settle whether ”Dialectical inquiry” or ”Devil’s
advocate” was the better form of conflict to improve the quality of decision and
learning. The difference between the two is that in dialectical inquiry a team is
divided into two sub-teams one of which is charged to work out a solution to a
given problem and state the assumptions that go into that solution. Next the other
sub-team has the task to challenge those assumptions and solution by positing
counterclaims and work out a ”counter”-solution. Finally the two sub-teams join
and argue an agreed joint solution.
In Devil’s advocacy there are also two sub-teams, but in this condition the second
sub-team is only charged to criticise weaknesses in the first sub-team’s
assumptions and solution, but not to work out alternative ones. The two sub-
teams join to argue an agreed solution on the basis of the first proposition and the
critique. Schweiger et al also had a consensus condition where the team was not
divided and no ”programmed conflict” was entered. The results showed no
significant difference between ”dialectical inquiry” and ”devil’s advocacy”
concerning quality of decision or critical evaluation of one’s own assumptions, but
both scored higher on both dimensions than the consensus condition. The
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consensus condition, on the other hand, demonstrated higher acceptance of group
decision and willingness to continue to work with the group. There were learning
effects in terms of time used to find solution etc. when the groups were given the
task to solve a second problem. These effects were higher in the condition of
”programmed conflict”. Schweiger et al (1989) can claim to have taken the study
of conflict and creativity as far toward realism as is possible in the laboratory.
They  conclude their account with the advice to take the issue to the field. One
could perhaps assume that something of significance happens when the two sub-
teams in the ”programmed conflict” condition argue a joint solution that
eliminates any difference that might have arisen as a consequence of the different
starting conditions.
Moscovici and Doise (1994) argue, chiefly on the basis of experiments conducted
by Moscovici over a long period, that groups tend toward ”polarisation”. The
experiments have had the following structure: A group of people (usually
students) are charged to reach agreement on a complex judgmental issue. Each
individual states his or her position (individually) on the issue before and after the
group session. In the group session the task is to reach agreement. It was found
that  this agreement tends toward extreme positions (not toward the ”average”
compromise). However, when some structure was placed on the group session,
like an agenda or a time limit, the group tended to reach a compromise between
the incoming opinions. An interesting aspect is that when groups reached
”polarised” opinion the individual opinions after the session had shifted toward
the group opinion, while in the compromise solution individuals tended to return
to their original opinion after the group session. Moscovici and Doise explain their
results with the argument that holders of extreme positions tend to be more
committed to their opinion and also to be better articulated. We see, maybe, a
glimpse of the ”group think” mechanism, but also how teams through consensus
calibration become effective in carrying out specific tasks after ”rules of the game”
have been formed through group polarisation. A corollary, if the Moscovici &
Doise results are generally valid, is that organisational change should be managed
on a group basis (rather than aim at influencing the individual directly, e.g., by out
of house training).
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Another type of studies relevant as background to this report is the area of
acculturation - integration of incoming company cultures into one joint culture -
in mergers and acquisitions. Larsson and Lubatkin (2000) review earlier research
finding that empirical evidence is scarce and fragmented. They  use a case survey
method applied to 50 case studies, which means that 50 detailed case studies were
coded, in the majority of cases the case author participated as one of the coders, to
complement the results of Cartwright and Cooper (1993), the most comprehensive
empirical study so far. C&C found that pre-merger cultural attributes of the
joining firms played a major role in determining post-merger acculturation. This
would mean that there is little scope for management of acculturation. L&L, on the
other hand, found that acculturation is best achieved when the buying firm relies
on ”social controls”, i.e., ”involving affected employees in introduction programs,
training, cross visits, joining retreats, celebrations and other such socialisation
rituals” (Larsson & Lubatkin 2000, p.2). ”Social controls” also worked well in
combination with ”Autonomy Removal” (when new financial reporting,
administrative, and operational procedures are imposed on the acquired firm).
This ”Autonomy Removal” did not generate successful acculturation on its own. It
required the informal activities as complement.
In an earlier report from this study (Jönsson et al 2000) we have shown how
complex the interaction between the disciplining coordination technologies and
the creative problem solutions in product development teams can be. Here we
want to focus on the immediate effects of confrontation in large product
development projects in terms of stereotyping and a permanent devil’s advocate
role in the team. Should one believe that the confrontations have creativity-
enhancing effects or do they generate depressive effects on motivation as well as
creativity? Could a stable role as the devil’s advocate in the team be a productive
one? Under what circumstances? In experiments the setting is under the control of
the experimenter, but in the field the context is unstable and it is not at all clear
what should be meant by the quality of a decision. Designing a component within
specification, time limit and target cost or  making it slightly more expensive but
with a revenue-increasing addition to customer value (the joy of driving the new
car)?
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The discussion will be divided into two parts. First a couple of illustrations will be
given to iconic confrontations in product development projects and how their
meaning is worked out by members of the teams in which they occurred. The
capture of such data was possible by the use of a video technique where the
confrontation episodes, recorded in the regular project management meetings, are
played back to members individually some time later and their comments elicited.
Then this empirically derived meaning of confrontations is compared with the
results of recent experiments with programmed conflict in groups and with
measurements of work climate done in one of the product development teams.
The setting
The setting for the studies of micro processes in product development reported
here is the alliance between Mitsubishi Motor Corporation (MMC) and Volvo Car
Corporation (VCC) located in Born, Holland. The two partners decided in 1992 to
form a joint venture to run an assembly plant to produce competing cars, designed
on the same technical platform, on a joint assembly line. A complex agreement
regulates how variations in capacity use (which is determined by the market
performance of the respective cars) is to be treated and how the parties contribute
to the budget of the joint venture which is a Dutch limited company owned 50/50
by the partners. Earlier the Dutch state was a third party. The joint venture is a
pure production company which is run according to the principles of ”lean
production” (Womack et al 1990) and as such it does not like the parties to
introduce many variants and late design changes in new year models. Success on
the European market, on the other hand, presupposes many variants and
evermore emotionally “loaded” designs – “joy of driving” being a criterion in
vogue where well defined engineering criteria like safety and quality used to
dominate. There is a contradiction in the very design of the alliance ñ the stability
and control of lean production is confronted with the flexibility and differentiation
of market-oriented design. “Sequential attention to goals” (Cyert and March 1963)
does not seem to be the solution, but bargaining and in bargaining the force of the
argument (Toulmin 1958) is the factor to observe.
A project charged with the task to develop a new car (even if it is a new year-
model of an existing car) is a major undertaking with several hundred engineers of
different speciality directly involved and with strong (contracted) rules on cost,
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time and quality. Each of these dimensions is followed up by separate staff units
which meet with the project management team regularly in separate meetings to
check that target costs are (Cost Review Meeting), quality standards and dead
lines (Quality “gates”) are met. There are strong disciplining incentives in these
governing structures because a “gate” is only “opened” (budgeted funds for the
next phase released) only when specifications (given in the project contract) are
met. One might wonder what happens when a “gate” is not opened, do hundreds
of engineers sit down and wait while the brake system engineers solve a
remaining problem? Of course not, a project may have passed Gate 5, while it is
still struggling to get through Gate 4 with that damned X problem. The project
leader will suffer a prestige loss if he (still no female project leader even if some
female engineers are close to the final step) is not able to keep the project together
and the brake specialists may not be considered brake specialists if they stumble.
Specialist on different levels are keen to demonstrate their capabilities to catch the
eye of the bosses and improve their career prospects. A project is an arena where
capabilities are demonstrated.
As pressure to reduce “time to market” has increased the development of many of
the components that go into a car has been “outsourced” to qualified suppliers,
and, suppliers who want to promote better long time relations may offer
interesting solutions on their own initiative. This means that project members will
travel around the world to negotiate solutions with specialised suppliers. Time
pressure also is an argument for “concurrent engineering” which means that
many development sub-processes that were run in sequence before now run in
parallel. But since the solution chosen in one of those sub-processes conditions
what is feasible in other processes there is an increased need for informal and
formal communication to coordinate action. An example of this is the area
Electricity, which may have to redesign cabelage or processor use as other areas
add or change functions using electronic devices. This criss-crossing
communication problem due to increased time pressure on con-current activities
is typically solved by increased frequency of face-to-face meetings (in this industry
engineers have all planning technology and all devices of electronic
communication one can imagine, but the more electronic communication the
greater need for face-to-face discussions it seems. The different R&D departments
at head quarters (engine, transmission etc) develop their own preferences as
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pressure for cleaner engines, more joy-of-driving etc. mount. There are economies
of scale to gain and a Brand Image to promote by having family resemblance
between cars of the same brand, and common parts in the different models of the
product portfolio. All this context structure sets the stage for the inner dialogue of
the project management team. It is the “ground” against which meaning is
attributed to  statements  and implications are worked out (Grice 1989):
Sequence 1. 1998 year model, Project management meeting, 19 February,
16.42 - 16.44.
The main actors in this sequence are Adam (a Dutchman), the representative of
production control in charge of steering the new model towards Production Start
without too much disturbance of current production and with deliveries from a
large number of suppliers arriving on time and in the right quantity and according
to specifications. He is a firm believer in ”lean production” and as such he needs
to be in control. Since purchasing is part of the production company the project
engineers, who negotiate solutions with suppliers, have to hand over
specifications to purchasing when a agreement has been closed for Purchasing to
manage ordering and logistics. The other actor is Bertrand (a Frenchman) who is
responsible for the GDI-project charged to adapt the environment friendly GDI-
engine to fit the new year model under an unrealistic time schedule. This engine is
supplied by Mitsubishi and he is already delayed by the late agreement between
Mitsubishi and Volvo and he needs to get a couple of GDI-engines installed in the
upcoming P2 trial series so tests can be done before Production Start. In order to
gain time he wants continuous feedback on the release/supplier situation for the
specific components needed to fit the engine to the Volvo car. He is negotiating
directly with the Mitsubishi Engine department, but with the suppliers of the
specific components via the purchasing department in Adam’s organisation
(designs are ready but suppliers have not confirmed delivery times and thus have
not been registered in the Production control system which Adam uses).
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The sequence is located fairly late in the meeting. When Adam is about to leave
after his point on the agenda, Bertrand catches the moment and tries to extract
information on how Production Control sees the current situation of the GDI-
project in comparison with last Friday.
Legend:
Pointed brackets, <....>, denote comments about what is going on besides talk.
Square brackets, [1....]1, denote overlapping talk.
Adam:
<a little upset>.....30 suppliers, partially not known, eh, on part level.
Let me have, once, eh,  such a detail to do a study!
 <preparing to leave the position up front>
Bertrand:
Adam! A question! <Adam standing up in front, head slightly  turned
to indicate that he is listening> Last Friday I received a  memo from
you with the situation. Since then I know that a lot of information
was exchanged between you, Michel and Peter. My question now is:
What is, according to you, the situation today compared with the
situation as described in the memo last Friday?
Adam:
I cannot tell. I will have to check after this meeting.
Bertrand:
Can you, please, send me the information on the GDI-situation today!
Because I never receive any information from you before ”No!
Impossible!” What I would like to see is how the trend is going on...
How the problem is maybe... eeeeh . [1.see.. how  the..<drowned by
Adam>]1
Adam:
I [1like to.. I like to]1 turn it around! I want to see from the
development side, eeh, you have to release. <shifting his paper pack
(8 cm) to his right hand and using it as support when he leans
forward somewhat>
Bertrand:
I do that <shaking his head>
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Adam:
Give total information, eh <gesticulating>
Bertrand:
I do that <still shaking his head>
Adam:
OK, make an overview
Bertrand:
I do that! And the overview is quite clear[2]2 from our point of
view[3]3. Just give me your view...
Adam:
[2 yeah?]2, [3good]3
Project leader:
Your feed[4back]4
Adam:
[4 and you]4 can have my view [5....yeah]5
Bertrand:
[5 from]5 your viewpoint and compared with last Friday. I just spoke
to Anton yesterday, I know what is the viewpoint of Anton on the
thirteen XX-suppliers. And the situation ... we can be somewhere! So
please let me know how the situation is through your eyes (?).
Project leader: <leaning back>
You are asking for feedback which is not.[6]6
Bertrand:
[6 yeah]6
Adam:
That is no problem! But please give me your report on your total
release situation! When can I have that?
Bertrand:
You can have it every GDI-meeting [7 every Tuesday]7
Adam:
[7 Yeah, but...when can you]7 send it to me?
Bertrand:
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Every second week every Tuesday morning between nine and [8
twelve]8
Adam:
[8 Ca... yeah..]8 can you... can you SEND it to me? That's what I 
request!.....When?
Bertrand :
Eeeeh.... the minutes will be sent this week.
Adam:
And all the releases are in?
Bertrand:
According.. according to what we know .. except this one. 
<pause> I see one problem... I can.. I can accept one, not five or six!
-end of sequence-
The discussion ends with project leader saying that now we have had our bi-
weekly struggle around issues which we have to tune outside this meeting. We are
many parties involved here and we have to do our utmost to give feedback to each
other to arrive at a conclusion about what the situation is. Then he thanks Adam
and says: "Michel and Bertrand, you will do your part in this and then Adam will
bring this into the P2" <turning to Adam who is passing behind him on his way
out> Adam catches the opportunity to make the joke "Don't make this into a
decision now!" (There had been a heated discussion earlier in the meeting about
whether an item in the minutes of the previous meeting was a ”Decision” or a
”Study Request”) and the matter is closed in general laughter.
What goes on here?
Adam has just finished reporting on his point on the agenda (last sentence appears
in the beginning of the excerpt) where he, as usual, exhorts product development
to provide more specific information when they ask about whether a specific
design will cause extra costs or investment in the production process. Bertrand
takes the opportunity to put pressure on Adam to give feedback on the progress of
the rush project to include the GDI-engine in the project so that it could be
included in the test production series (called P2). Bertrand feels that he is not
getting full cooperation from Adam’s department, Production Control, in his
efforts to catch up with the very stretched time plan for the GDI-project to go into
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this year model. Bertrand has to ”cut corners” to make it and this makes the
bureaucratic attitude of Adam even more frustrating. Bertrand wants to trap
Adam with a question that looks innocent enough, but is based on the assumption
that the memo that Adam sent last Friday was incorrect and that this could be
exposed in front of everybody. Adam would lose face not having done his
homework properly and, as a consequence he could be pressured to be more
helpful in the future.
Adam had been subjected to pressure during the half an hour or so that his point
on the agenda lasted. His department does not respond to proposed solutions
quick enough and Adam’s counter argument was that he does not get complete
information on the release  (formally decided and documented design changes)
from the project for the different variants. Time pressure is building up before trial
production of series P2. Adam’s line of argument is that he wants overview as
well as details. He is a bit upset at the beginning of the sequence and gives his exit
statement demanding, ”for once”, details (some of the parts do not have a listed
supplier in his system, lead time being a critical variable) so he can make a proper
study of proposed changes and their effect on Process.
 As he is about to leave Bertrand surprises him with the question. What is the
situation compared to last Friday? Adam wants to dismiss the question by saying
that he will check after the meeting, but Bertrand engages him with criticism for
lack of feedback. Gamesmanship is applied and Adam turns the question around
and asks for total information and overview. Bertrand counter by pointing out that
this is given in the regular GDI-meetings (to which Adam is invited).  Adam does
not go to meetings; he wants the information sent to him. Bertrand begins to
hesitate and says, vaguely, that the minutes will be sent ”this week” (This is said
on a Wednesday afternoon). With all the releases? Adam asks, gaining an upper
hand. Bertrand, knowing that he is not in total control of his sub-project, can
accept that he has one problem which remains unsolved but not as many as he is
accused of in Adam’s Friday memo (Bertrand knows that the missing suppliers for
13 components is due to this information not being fed into Adam’s system even if
it is available, because he talked to Anton who is in charge of purchasing and
Adam’s subordinate).  The project leader, tries to explain to the two combatants
that the discussion is about feedback.
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The sequence illustrates how the bad conscience of project leaders (who never
have everything completely under control) can be turned against them. The
question is what is gained by Adam winning this battle of wills in this meeting.
He will still have the GDI-project to work with and the pressure will be on.
Production Control is not likely to make the two owners give up this GDI-project
which ties the Mitsubishi-Volvo- alliance closer together! It is good politics to help
this GDI project forward! Creativity on the part of Bertrand will mean trying to get
around Adam and approach his subordinates directly. Adam will counteract with
formal agreements on rules (the following year he pushed through an agreement
that car projects must channel all design changes through a ”window person” who
will have a corresponding window person in Production Control - Adam).
The sequence interpreted by participants.
The method of analysis is to play the video sequence back to participants
individually about two months after the meeting and ask the question ”What is
going on here?”. The comments were audiotaped and transcribed. The comments
by the main actors are treated first.
Bertrand’s first reaction to this sequence is "What can I say?" He remembers the
scene very well. Adam had sent a MEMO-report on the release situation "last
Friday" where he summarises what Purchasing and some other department has
said. When Bertrand checked with Purchasing (Anton who participated in the
PMG meeting) he found out that Adam’s information was not true. Bertrand had
been worried by the statement that there were no supplier for 13 components, and
upset when Purchasing said it was not true. Somebody had made a mistake in
Production Control and not fed the data into the system and when it is not in the
system it is unknown to Adam. Bertrand’s idea was to force Adam to admit a
mistake, but instead he turned the question around and applied counter pressure.
Bertrand thought that a joint discovery that both were right (the information was
there but not in the system) could be a basis for the future. He explains the
situation (which is not an uncommon one) as being due to the fact that Adam does
not have enough people to work things through and therefore uses the more
comfortable tactic of accusing the accuser of having a weak case (give me total
information!). Bertrand’s ultimate goal is to make Production Control realise how
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much simpler everything would be if  they set aside half an hour every second
week to attend the GDI-meetings. They never turn up.
Adam’s first comment is also ”What can I say?” He then gives an account for the
background to the problem where the point is that the Volvo approach to doing a
project is not "complying" with the NedCar organisation. We (Production Control)
do not get the complete information needed to do a study as requested.
Apparently it is very hard to explain to Volvo members that they do not give
correct information. Therefore it is not possible to answer something which cannot
be answered. Adam also points out that he cannot attend the separate GDI
meetings. He is present in almost all PMG meetings, except during the last few
months he has been more and more absent, and we can discuss GDI in that
meeting. What he wants to get across is that Production Control needs is proper
information not only "fiddling out information or whatever thick reports".
 On the question whether GDI is a special case due to its late addition to the 4097
he says that it is basically true that they have a short lead time, but many parts are
common with Mitsubishi and 4097 and not so many unique parts. They should be
able to handle it.
Both parties want to teach the other how to work properly to get the job done.
None of them seems to succeed. In the short term, at the meeting, it seems like
Adam got the upper hand by turning the question around and making Bertrand
hesitate as to when he could deliver the minutes from the GDI-meeting and to
admit that he has one remaining problem.
The project leader describes the incident as Bertrand asking for feedback (which
he also says twice in the sequence). Than he uses a metaphor to describe the
background: “When you send in a PEC (Product Engineering Change) it is like a
black hole – no response”. This problem is so much the more critical for the GDI-
project, which is under strong pressure to catch up, if it were to end up in “the
same treadmill”.. he sympathises with Bertrand’s problem. Adam is described as a
“bureaucrat” and he defends himself by attack. To further illustrate the differences
in ways-of-working the project leader tells a story about a recent incident where
information was sent to Production Control concerning the Middle East variant.
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The only change was that components A and B (properly specified) were to be
replaced by components Y and Z (also properly specified). This was not accepted
by Adam on the same grounds! (Give me total information!).
The conclusion given is that the two actors did not solve their problem but they
exposed a weak spot in “our interaction”. One possible explanation is that
Production Control simply do not have enough people. It is not only that they
have less people than “we have in our own plants in the corresponding
department” but also that they have 3 – 4 variants in parallel, Furthermore they do
not have one annual model change but two (Mitsubishi and Volvo). But their
response to the slogan “lean organisation” has turned into “mean organisation”.
The core meaning of lean organisation is not to have too few people but to be
especially clever in adapting to new situations quickly.
Non-speakers
The project secretary explains the sequence in terms of the unrealistic time plan
the GDI-project has to meet. He was surprised that the project leader accepted to
take it on board. Bertrand is working from Sweden where he has a little team that
tries to speed up the release process by having meetings on the status of the
different releases. He wants Adam to participate in those meetings and give his
opinions on the consequences if this or that release were to come in on this or that
date (to help prioritising efforts) but Adam refuses to respond on the basis of
inadequate information. It is a game of covering your ass in preparation for the
quality gates. Bertrand is a bright guy but he does not know how things are done
at NedCar and because of that he needs to ask the NedCar people “Is it OK if I
give you this information?” or “Tell me whet information you need!” He also is in
an ambiguous spot since the project leader is responsible even if Bertrand is a kind
of a project leader. Adam is also irritated at being put in a tough role like this – the
project secretary (a Dutchman like Adam) thinks that something else is going on
behind this – but he is trained to act like this for Production Control. The project
leader has tried all the time to build a team “involving all disciplines”, and he has
not succeeded in this sense (Adam’s role), but he keeps trying.
The deputy project leader sees Bertrand as a “fresh wind” in the project. He came
in late (and has not yet full knowledge of the tricks of the trade). This sequence is
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an illustration of this. Bertrand tries to take the discussion with Adam in front of
everybody, something that the project leader or his deputy would never do
(unless the “cup runneth over”). Perhaps Bertrand’s cup was full here. The conflict
escalates between, on the one hand, Production Control’s avoidance of project
meetings and their demand for consolidated information on paper before they
study an issue and accept or reject a solution, and, on the other hand, our efforts to
build the team and develop the alliance. They are not members of the team and
they come here to report (not to contribute) and they think that the PMG is an
ineffective meeting. The deputy project leader can agree that the meetings are not
very effective, but he has not seen anybody that can do it better. The purpose is for
23 – 25 people, everybody with executive responsibility, to try to align their views.
Teambuilding is a challenge, especially when you cannot hand pick every
member, which is the case here. This group contrasts distinctly with the Steering
Committee pre-trial, (where the deputy project leader is a member, and where
Process, Mitsubishi, and Volvo meet to decide, formally, about proposals). In that
meeting everything is prepared in advanced (you only make enemies by trying to
start a discussion) – very Japanese!
Quality comments that Production Control probably does not have the manpower
to attend meetings or to respond to this way of working so they respond with
counter questions instead. The GDI people have worked hard with providing
information and in the end it is only a matter of a list of releases which has been
presented at the GDI meetings. Bertrand has gone it through with Purchasing and
they say we have this and, we have this, and what he wants now is confirmation,
but he doesn’t get it. They don’t give progress information on the current
situation. They have their meetings and they are not part of the project. We are
used to work as a team and try to solve problems and move ahead, while they
work by the book (“we have not got this or that form”).
Purchasing (a Dutchman) starts by stating that Adam expects good engineering
information to accompany a formal release. At certain moments you have to
legalise what you are doing, by showing the system what you are doing. The fact
is that the system releases are not done in this case. That is what Adam is referring
to. He knows that the project is working in a grey area and wants to make it as
black as possible. He cannot tell his assistants what to do until the releases are
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there and until then he has no planning. The GDI-meetings are 90 % technology
and 10 % Purchasing or Production Control. Therefore it is not useful for people
with a tight time schedule to attend. That is why the miss some vital information.
Interior (who has worked in the alliance since its start 5 years ago) sees the
situation in this sequence as dealing with materials for the upcoming trial
production (P2). The cause of the discussion is that Adam does not participate in
Bertrand’s project meetings, so this discussion pops up in the PMG meeting.
Bertrand cannot control his release situation unless he gets response from Adam,
who claims that 13 releases are missing while Bertrand to one problematic release.
This sequence illustrates the difference between a team player and a spectator.
Adam does not act until he gets the information (“When can you send it to me?”)!
He could have walked over and to Bertrand to get a copy! He is marking territory!
Interior’s theory is that Bertrand thinks it has gone too far and he wants to face
Adam down in front of the project leader so that he can see the cause of many of
Bertrand’s problems. Interior is impressed by Bertrand’s behaviour. He controls
himself, does not raise his voice, he is just stubborn. Swedes can be seen raising
their voices in some of these sequences but Bertrand stays cool. Adam does not
have an answer so he turns it around – give me your release plan! This is a
personality clash rather than a cultural one. In fact nobody in the room knows
how to work with Adam, so they tip-toe and watch their step. We work fairly well
with the others but that man...
Properties sees the sequence as starting off well with a very concrete question. The
respondent should have done, what he avoids, answer the question. But then
Bertrand enters into accusations and the whole thing degenerates, even if they
tried to repair. One noticeable thing here is the danger of a third party (the project
leader) trying to interfere. It doesn’t help.
Bertrand has a complex job. He uses the support (Quality, Economy, General
Support, Properties, Testing) of the project and in this sense it is a System Task
(Engine and Transmission for the GDI). But he is also responsible for complete
vehicle consequences of the GDI engine. He has dual roles. Furthermore all
projects are different, and the projects down here (Born. Holland) are different
from the ones at headquarters (attitudes of management, discipline in meetings
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etc.). Also language is a restricting factor for everybody no matter how good they
are in languages, and Bertrand has to communicate with people here , in
Gothenburg and at the Mitsubishi engine plant in Japan. He is not a well-trained
project leader  but you have to admire him for doing his utmost in this gigantic
task. His project is like running a medium sized company without proper support,
not even a secretary. Leaders in companies have time to be social, that is not the
case in this project. The effect is that you burn yourself out.
Body thinks that Bertrand is mostly annoyed by Adam not coming to his meetings
and there is some pie throwing in this sequence. These tough guys from
Production Control haven’t always done their homework so the start out by
shooting from the hip. When a thing pops up like this they start complaining
about what a bad job we are doing in order to cover up their own short comings.
This cannot be proven of course, but that is how one feels about it. Body illustrates
by telling a story about a case when there was trouble with a certain body colour.
Body kept asking “Is there a problem?” and the responsible guy would talk about
plans or something else or just say “no”. This went on for 9 months! Had he
reported his troubles we could have done something about it together, but he
covered up until the failure was obvious. They don’t work like we do!
The project controller laments if only Process could step out of their office to keep
informed. They want everything served at their table! Maybe they are short on
personnel, maybe they are not interested. The GDI-project is on a short time
schedule, everybody has to chip in. It will probably not work without a
representative from Process on the GDI-meetings. In the worst case we will not get
the GDI-car on the production line.
Chassi and Installation sees a pattern also present in some other sequences. Adam
comes in, says “No!” and walks out. He does not have the background to help
since he does not go to meetings and he has not given any comments on this issue
before. Chassi remembers that the tension was released to some extent by a joke
that is not shown in the sequence. His opinion is that Adam lost face here.
Electricity defines the problem of this sequence as being that the GDI-project is
supposed to build their first trial series, but they do not get the needed feedback
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from Production Control to know whether it is possible; have orders been sent
out, have suppliers confirmed delivery dates etc.. Adam wants all documentation
on hand before he pronounces judgement. In fact it is Adam who orders materials
(even if Purchasing helps him) and he gets the feedback from suppliers on
delivery dates. This is a unique way of working! He (Adam) does not want to
participate in discussions, he wants everything sent to him! When asked
Electricity cannot say whether this is Adam’s personal way or if it is a mirror of
NedCar’s philosophy. However the new window person who comes to the
meetings for Production Control now is more is willing to discuss solutions, so it
is probably Adam’s personal style, no doubt this sequence is “typical Adam”.
In summary the participants interpret this exchange as a power game between
Bertrand, representing the project culture (where Production adapts to “niche-
designed” cars) and Adam representing the lean production culture (where design
is supposed to come up with a production friendly car). Bertrand wants to make
Adam “lose face”  by exposing his unwillingness or inability to give feedback
(which is an important norm in the project culture). Adam ripostes by attacking on
Bertrand’s weak spot (give total information) and Bertrand’s bad consciousness
(he never has “total information” about all details of his project since “concurrent
engineering” is used to meet an impossible time schedule. Bertrand is especially
vulnerable since he really needs these trial cars for testing. Adam feels vulnerable
as long as he does not have all information in his system. Coordinating by
systematic information compilation is pitted against coordination by face-to-face
meetings where people make commitments they are expected to meet.
A tentative description/explanation of what is going on based on interviews and
observation of similar incidents in this and other projects is the following: A car
project is an unusually complex project – it is big, involves many advanced
suppliers, and competition against a background of overcapacity in the world
adds to the pressure. Organisations develop “ways-of-working” (rules of the
game) which help members cope with complexity. When there is no obvious
objective to direct rational choice members may fall back on “ways-of-working” to
construct the appropriate, professional approach to a problem. In situations where
two or more “ways-of-working” are confronted an interface problem is
discovered. A problem that is emotionally loaded because the rules of appropriate
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behaviour, which are laid down in the respective ways-of-working form the basis
for “constituent expectancies” (Garfinkel 1963) of the game, and these expectancies
are now frustrated. This adds to the complexity of the situation for people like
Bertrand. The temptation to use stereotyping to “simplify” things must be great.
Both parties accuse one another of behaving “unprofessionally”.
Communication aspects
An interesting question on this sequence is whether it was good tactics by
Bertrand to start this confrontation. Even if he would succeed in making Adam
lose face in front of everybody it is unlikely that Adam would be persuaded to
participate in a change of the rules of the game. His position, to demand total
information (all releases) from “the design side” and then, on this basis claim that
it is up to Production Control to judge whether the changes are acceptable or not,
is backed up by the organisation he represents. This perspective is an analytical,
planning approach where rational decision based on complete information is the
ideology. The project ideology is one of action in teamwork and keeping informed
through interaction rather than by document. This requires participation in
meetings and adaptation to the changing situation. Garfinkel’s (1963) studies show
that people expand large amounts of emotional energy to maintain or re-establish
the rules of the game. Adam, gives the impression (observation over a 2 year
period in two consecutive projects) of seeing his task as being to smooth the way
for the lean production regime of NedCar by reducing the number of changes and
variants to a minimum, which is rational given that the NedCar organisation is
under strong pressure to keep costs at a minimum (a policy supported by the top
managers from Volvo on the Board of Directors of NedCar). Given that this is a
correct description the only road to a change of heart would be through top-down
decisions in the NedCar organisation and this could only be initiated if the project
leader persuades the top managers of Volvo that NedCar should be more flexible.
This means that Bertrand is trying to send a message to the project leader through
this confrontation. The fact that the confrontation is taken in the PMG meeting is a
signal that the situation is desperate and everything else has been done.
The project leader first intervenes in the confrontation by translating the issue into
one of feedback (which nobody can refuse), twice, but it does not seem to have
much effect. In his conclusion of the matter (after the sequence) he refers to the
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team spirit by pointing to the fact that many parties are involved and everybody
must do their utmost to help.
Bertrand’s tactics to ask a concrete question about facts to “trap” Adam seems to
serve his purpose as Adam admits that he does not know. It is probably standard
procedure in most situations to “test” the appropriateness of “rules of the game”
against concrete cases (Jönsson & Macintosh 1997). Given that the parties had
agreed that there was an information gap they could have embarked upon
(temporary) rule construction for the GDI emergency, but the process degenerates
when Bertrand follows up with an accusation – the opportunity to reach a
common “definition of the situation” was lost. Instead Bertrand could have sought
concessions about the need for current feedback against his own promise to pay
better attention to the need to “legalise” activities of the project by entering them
into the system (as Purchasing suggests).
Resolution
According to Bertrand this issue was “solved” by moving the matter up the
hierarchy. Adam and Bertrand got a memo from Adam’s boss saying to Adam
“You solve this! See to it that the information from GDI is correct” (in the system),
and to Bertrand “You must see to it that Adam gets the right information!” After
this push Adam responded to Bertrand and it turned out (according to Bertrand)
that Bertrand’s information was the correct one. This took energy and time.
Bertrand drew the conclusion that it had to be lifted to a higher level because
Adam does not see himself as “co-operating on the same level” as the responsible
engineers in the project (ST (system task) managers) as was intended. The sore
nerve on the design side seems to be this perception of inequality in level between
Adam and the ST-managers. Here lies a cultural difference, but it is the traditional
one between Design and Production?
Sequence 2, 1999 year model, project management group meeting, 29.
October 1997 11.38 – 11.40
Setting:
Charles, who is responsible for Chassi and Installation in the project to develop
the 1999 year model, is reporting on the situation in his area of responsibility as
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scheduled in the agenda and part of this report concerns the outcome of a recent
Cost Review Meeting (CRM) where the whole project, area by area, is followed up
on how they have managed to stay within target costs for each component. In
these meetings the established target cost for each component is compared with
the latest estimate for that cost, which consists of the production cost or
purchasing cost of the component itself, plus investment in the production process
due to the component, tools, and engineering hours invested in the design.
According to Volvo standards the ST-manager (e.g. Engine, or Body) is
responsible for all costs related to the task and their project budget is based on
that. However, in order to get estimates of what consequences a certain design
change will have in the production process the ST-manager wants to know, before
investing too much engineering hours in a specific design, what kind of effects can
be expected in “process”. If, for example, the change will cause considerable
tooling costs it is better to stop the idea before engineering hours have been spent
on something that is not going to be economically feasible anyway. In this case
such estimates of effects in the production process have to come from NedCar,
which is a joint venture company with Mitsubishi under strict budget restrictions.
NedCar does not want to spend their engineers valuable time responding to
vague, unspecified engineering changes. They would like Volvo to behave like
Mitsubishi that comes in with a specification of the next model without late
additions of changes. Then lean production can be a reality! The budget of NedCar
is based on the preliminary design of each of the two cars that will go into
production during the year. This preliminary design (usually also the final design
for Mitsubishi) is specified, part by part, on “Design Concept Sheets”. If somebody
of the two joint venture parties want to change the design after the budget has
been decided they have to assume responsibility for the extra costs this causes in
the joint venture by signing the bill for it. This means that there are crossing
responsibilities here. The design engineers have responsibility also for costs that
arise in the joint venture organisation, but on the other hand they have a basis for
negotiation in the fact that they have the last word – they may refuse to sign a bill
for unreasonable costs. NedCar on their part have strict responsibility for keeping
their budget, and an opportunity to expand that budget by extra-budgetary
investment due to design changes.
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Charles (and several of his colleagues) had been surprised by cost estimates
provided by the cost engineering department of NedCar. Estimates that they
heard for the first time at the CRM and which in some cases demonstrated that
“problems” that were believed solved came to life again. Such estimates should,
according to established procedure, be reported on PEC forms and thus be known
by the responsible design engineers. Charles starts the exchange, but soon the
controller takes over: Adam, Production Control of NedCar, is on one of his short
visits to the PMG meeting:
The sequence
Legend:
Text in pointed brackets <...> comments on activities beside speech
Square brackets [1...]1 denote overlapping talk (note that there is no overlapping
talk in this sequence)
DT = Design Task is a subordinate unit to an ST = System Task
PEC= Product Engineering Change (a form that summarises all information
concerning a design change (including process costs). Also called “Yellow Forms”.
Other speakers than Charles and Adam are named by their responsibility area.
Charles:
.. during the CRMs we had the cost engineering guys from NedCar
here coming in saying that this is going to cost you this and this is
going to cost you that and my DTs and myself have not heard about
these costs ... and while you are here Adam... I sent you a memo on
this .. <lower voice> I don't know whether you agree..<normal
voice>.but I don't know where all these costs come from... we can't
find them in PECs we can't find any memos and some of them have
not even been discussed properly in activity teams.
<Body trying to break in>
Adam:
Costs come from the basic plan and from issues..... yeah I suppose
now they are updated... and in those... that document you find the
investments
Project Leader:
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But aren't it normal that you have it also in PECs?
Adam:
Initially that is not needed!
Electricity:
But if the investment is dependent upon the technical design that we
do? But if you don't get the feedback that this will cost you that
much!?
Adam:
But, listen! We have sheets for design... design concept sheets. That is
correct so we know the design. We report than in the cost integrated
plan (?) So you can discuss with these departments about the cost of
course.. no problem.. if you are okay on that then you know that this
will be the cost for this project. If you change the design then you
have a problem!
Quality (?):
Then you will see it on the PECs
Electricity:
I had the same experience as Charles! The first time I saw these costs
was when I got a thick booklet <showing with the fingers how thick a
pile of paper it was> .. and when I read it through it said "investment
in final assembly"! I never heard of it! It had never been reported to
me nor my DTs! It is not implemented in yellow forms, I don't have a
budget for it! I don't know what it is!
Adam:
I don't report to DTs not even to STs
Electricity:
Then it is not my problem, because I don't take the cost!
Controller:
But Adam! If we do not have corresponding figures between the sum
of the yellow sheets and the  basic plan we cannot sign the basic plan.
We don't have those costs in the PECs therefore we do not have them
in the yellow sheets. So we need to have the PECs updated, and the
costs are splitted (sic!) up per DT!
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Adam:
No need. There is no need to have that additional investment on the
PECs
Controller:
Yes
Adam:
Why?
Controller:
Because we need to penetrate those costs as well as all other costs per
DT and it is the STs responsibility to say if these figures are correct or
not. The basic plan is just the sum of all costs and when that sum fits
with the sum of our yellow forms then the basic plan is okay. If it is
not the same sum then it is not okay!
- end of sequence-
What goes on here?
Charles initiates a complaint that in the cost review meetings cost engineers from
NedCar have presented investment costs in final assembly due to product changes
which have not been heard of before and which have not been recorded in the
appropriate documents. Charles was confronted with cost overruns that he could
not explain in the CRM and he is upset. It seems like NedCar is sending bills
which have not been agreed, and Charles appears unprofessional in front of
people from head quarters who conduct the CRMs. Adam explains that the costs
are recorded in the basic plan (on which the budget is based). If you change the
design then you have problems! The project leader points out that these extra
investment costs will show up on the PECs  according to standard procedure.
Adam says no, not needed. Electricity, backs up Charles’ complaint and points out
that if these costs were known the project might have chosen other solutions. It is
not possible to assume cost responsibility without information. Adam invokes
territory by stating that he does not report to DTs or STs. The controller intervenes
by explaining the rules of the game between Volvo and NedCar on this issue. If
the figures do not match Volvo will not sign the bill and clearly indicates that he is
the one who checks the figures before the Volvo representative on the NedCar
board signs the bill for extra costs.
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One should note that even if this exchange is highly emotionally loaded people
speak in an orderly fashion without overlapping talk. All participants seem very
attentive. This is an important issue!
Comments by participants.
Charles first comment when reviewing this sequence is about  his satisfaction that
he was the one who brought this issue up, because everybody recognised the
problem and had similar experiences. At the same time it is clear that Adam does
not recognise the problem because he has a fixed budget based on predetermined
volumes and designs ( If you change the design then you have a problem!). He
does not see the relation to how product development responsibility is run in
Volvo (which includes cost increases in process due to changes). Charles is of the
opinion that this issue has not been resolved and probably never will be. When
asked “What exactly is the problem here?” Charles uses an example: Suppose that
we were to change the design of the steering wheel making it “deeper”. This
would mean that they take up more space in the racks used to transport and store
the steering wheels in Production. Either the racks have to be modified or more
racks are needed for the same volume. That will cost some thousand Guilders.
Obviously Design has to carry that cost, but if we are never told and if we are not
able to check whether it is a reasonable connection with our design change .... But
Adam has a lump sum budget for investment in tools and process of millions of
Guilders. He does not need to come back to his superiors and ask for more money
until that account shows a deficit. Then he will use some persuasive examples of
effects of design changes initiated by the owners to justify the budget increase. But
Charles and his colleagues need to know the details and as early as possible if they
are to be able to keep within target costs. We cannot work with a steering wheel
that will cost 5 million for the planned volume and suddenly be told that now it
will cost 5.5! Many little things like this will cause an overrun of the project budget
and somebody up there will be pissed off! The actual cost increase in this case was
not very big but where will it all end if a stop is not put to this?
The project leader describes the sequence as an encounter between “two ways of
working.” He reiterates that in Volvo the ST-managers are responsible for all costs
that their design changes cause and this must be accounted for in one document
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(not bits and pieces). NedCar is responsible for process costs and they must
respond twice. First when the project sends them “Design Concept Sheets” (DCS)
which contain the technical solution to a design job, and then when they get the
“Product Engineering Change” (PEC) that is the final solution. Almost always
there is a development between the two since details are worked out. Volvo places
emphasis on the PEC (because it is a document that is worked through) while
NedCar builds its budget on the DCS. The PEC is important because it announces
the coming implementation order (AO). The project leader also states his respect
for the competence of the cost engineering department of NedCar. The problem is
that they work only with the PECs and they do not check the responses the project
gets from Production Control on the DCSs. They are very thorough in their follow-
up of consequences, talk to Purchase especially the Purchasing Engineers, the
Suppliers etc to find cheaper solution. A small dedicated group with lots of
knowledge. It is their information we see in the reviews of the cost situation per
Design Task (in the DRMs). In sum, the PEC-based cost information is more
reliable than the information based on the DCSs, if they do not match it is the PEC
information that is valid. Now, the Basic Plan is a summary (based on the DCSs to
start with) of the effects of the project on NedCar operations. Since NedCar is an
organisation run as a cost centre the changes documented on the PECs have to be
included when the Basic Plan goes to the Board of Directors for attestation. It is
thus very important for NedCar to have the complete project described the basic
plan since this is the base for budgeting (including investment in process). There is
little understanding for this in the project; NedCar cannot take decisions on the
operational level on process changes when Volvo wants to change the design of
the product. On its way to the Board the request for budget according to the basic
plan (or changes to it) goes through a check on the operational level (where the
controller who is active in this sequence does the checking but a senior manager
signs). So Volvo has the final word (in the NedCar board) on the effects on process
from product design changes.
The discussion in this sequence is about discrepancies between the figures on the
DCS and the PECs. The project leader admits that there is a “grey zone” between
updating the DCS and the final PEC. The local office is working on the procedural
aspects of this. This is a parallel process to the project. NedCar needs to recover
their costs from the owners/customers, who in turn need to design a car with
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properties that will sell it in the markets. The problem for NedCar is that they do
not have a budget for adapting the production process to the new models that
come every year, that has to be settled for each specific launch.
The controller starts with the background in the Cost Review Meeting where costs
are checked ST by ST. The ST- manager meets the controller, the project
accountant in charge of that ST, Cost Engineering. The Costing group, that works
with tools and components is also represented. The CRM basically goes through
the current cost reports item by item to check whether they accord with the
opinion of the ST-managers who are responsible. It turns out that for almost all the
STs estimated process costs do not match the information on the Yellow forms of
the DCS/PEC. These Yellow forms are supposed to be filled in from the start and
then up-dated as the project proceeds. The explanation is that Production has not
responded with new estimates caused by the changes and ST-managers are unable
to consider full cost effects in their design decisions. On top of it Adam claims that
they have all costs in the basic plan, plus he does not report to ST or DTs. The
problem for him is that the cost in the basic plan is just their offer as long as it has
not been formally accepted by Volvo. Charles wanted to “lift” this issue and
Electricity seconds his concern (they are responsible for “time, technology and
cost”) to get support from the project leader in this. The irritation is directed at
Adam.
The matter has not been resolved after the meeting. Volvo has not signed the
budget because the basic plan figures do not match the information on the
“Yellow Sheets”. These “Yellow Sheets” are viewed by NedCar as internal Volvo
documents. A requirement from the project is that Production Control be
represented at the costing meeting to explain their figures, but they don’t turn up.
There is hope though. The Controller has heard that NedCar has complained to
Volvo on a higher level that the projects do not pay proper attention to the
consequences in production and this opens up for the argument that a good
premise for such attention is that NedCar informs about them. The matter might
be solved in time for the next year model. In sum this sequence illustrates
differences in ways-of-working. The controller complains that it is a gigantic task
to check tool costs and components cost for the CRMs and added to that one has
this non-response from production. It’s probably that they are short on people
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rather than the lean production ideology. Adam got a Belgian assistant with
experience from the Gent plant and even some from the Gothenburg plant - he
even knows some Swedish - to support him on this. That’s promising.
Electricity, who spoke in the sequence in support of Charles claims, starts his
comments by saying that this is not about costs but about “ways-of-working”. “It
seems like we have no definition of how we ... Electricity starts again by
explaining how it is normally done when a design change is contemplated. You
get estimates on tooling costs, component costs and “at home” we get estimates
from “production control” about likely effects on assembly time, necessary
changes in equipment. In that way we can weigh investment in the process against
savings in assembly time etc. As it is here one doesn’t have the faintest... what my
design draws in investment... they report a big lump sum for investment in
process. (Electricity talks in unfinished sentences... he is upset also when he looks
at the video recording). This is a huge problem... you are responsible  and
suddenly you get these surprises, and “the controller” cannot follow up either
since we only have this lump sum for investment. Electricity, who is fairly new in
this project, has spent some time trying to trace how these figures emerge and
where they come from. He tells a story about  an estimate on the lower level of a
150.000 guilders the grew on its way up in different summations to 300.000 and
how the guys who did the original calculation are not allowed to tell the ST
managers directly. So when we get the figure we don’t know what it is! The
problem is that Adam doesn’t either, but his attitude, that the design must be
frozen when the DCSs are summarised, is frustrating. It is as if his basic plan is the
end product.
Electricity starts to philosophise how this came to be: Maybe it goes back to Job
One when everything was one big warm bosom. Everybody chipped in and it
didn’t matter who spent the money. But now quality is the core issue, running
changes to improve the product, 3-4 project running in parallel. Suddenly it is
damned important who is responsible for what cost. People write time on this or
that project. We have to investigate the allocation of cost within the project
because there are different sources of payment....well no wonder procedures are
not stabilised.
(No comments from Adam on this sequence)
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Non-speakers
The deputy project manager first comments that “we lack internal routines...ways-
of-working... deficiencies in interface with NedCar...ambiguity in how cost..how
communication on cost is managed. We work on ST-level and others communicate
more on the managerial level”. The deputy project manager searches his mind
how to articulate the ambiguity that is illustrated in this sequence.
Adam says that if you change the design then it is your problem and that is
making it easy. The problem  is that since the ST managers do not have
transparency they cannot be held responsible for all cost that they cause. For the
deputy project leader who came down here fairly recently it was so natural that
you didn’t think about it - the fact that you have to have the information if you are
to be held responsible. In that sense the experience in the project has been
somewhat of an aha!-experience. Things you took for granted before have become
visible and you have to think about them. He is still unsure about what is included
in ST responsibility here. From negotiations with suppliers to the moment when
the car leaves the assembly line, where does it start and where does it end? It is
important to work with these issues, but the first task is to get the car ready in
time and within specifications.
Testing (whole vehicle) is a Dutchman, who has developed a kind of a father-role
in the project based in his ability to provide context that renders confusing
situations understandable. This ability builds on his experience with both
organisations (and in a certain burly fatherly identity). He describes in some detail
the Basic Plan document (“shows in a small column NedCar investment related to
the project, and it gives only total sums”). Therefore the STs and DTs sometimes
see the investment costs they are responsible for sometimes not. They tend to “pop
up” in meetings like the CRMs. First Adam claims that the project engineers can
see their costs in the basic plan then he says something like don’t ask me for the
details I only work with the lump sums! That is the issue here: Why doesn’t
NedCar communicate the figures on DT level? Testing says that this wouldn’t be
difficult because the investment figures are worked out by the Activity Teams (a
group with the project engineer, process engineer, and purchasing). These teams
are supposed to treat the PECs, whatever problem a change may carry with it is
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discussed and consequences agreed in the Activity Teams. Adam wants to apply a
stricter rule – that activity teams are to be set up only after NedCar has agreed to
do so and after have worked through the whole project content based on Design
Concept Sheets. The Volvo side wants to have the discussion earlier, before they
have committed engineering work to a technical solution, in order to avoid
wasting engineering hours on something that would draw too much investment
costs in the process.
The issue will stay with us for a while because the routine in place now is not a
good one. NedCar is not likely to change easily because the decision on the basic
plan is taken on the board level. It is central to their control structure. It becomes
tricky when this basic plan does not represent the Truth anymore.
Technical Documentation (stationed at headquarters) is surprised that there can be
disagreement between the basic plan and the sum of the “Yellow Sheets” (which
are specified for each  Task – ST as well as DT). The problem in this sequence
should never arise! If the STs and the DTs need some information they should
seek out Adam and get it! Adam should not have to seek out the STs or DTs to
inform them about the consequences of what the STs and DTs have decided (they
should know that before they decide). People should not be “surprised” in CRMs,
it is one thing if they have been told that it will cost them 10 thousand and later
find out that it is 25 thousand, but if they have not made the effort to find out what
the cost is in the first place they should not be surprised. Technical Documentation
stresses “due diligence” as a requirement. Next he states complete agreement with
the controller claim that one cannot have a basic plan that does not match the
“Yellow Sheet” information. That is the basic problem here. This project is run
according to established Volvo practice (with “Yellow Sheets” etc.), while NedCar
sees its Basic Plan as a fixed decision to be adapted to. It is a matter of who is in
control, the plan or the “real” project as documented in Yellow Forms. There is
politics in this. They are used to being in control, but that is not the way it is
supposed to be.
Technical Documentation is of the opinion that this issue has not been resolved-
they work problem by problem here - and when the next year model project starts
in a couple of weeks they are likely to fall into the same predicament. In the long
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run the parties will move towards a common understanding, conflict by conflict.
The gates (sequence of 10 meetings to check the progress of the project) provide an
arena to remind the project and Production Control that Yellow Forms and Basic
Plan should match. Technical Documentation is very sensitive to the
“unambiguity” of the underlying process. He also points out that Adam overplays
his role of schoolmaster to the project. There is also mention of a new
representative of Production Control who is more open to discussion and at the
same time tries to argue the Production view.
Exterior, a newly promoted Dutchman, coming from NedCar, points out that
when Adam starts the discussion he should have said “Every PEC goes via our
costing department. They have the information even if they have never seen the
Yellow Forms”, but do their own calculations. Volvo has its “Yellow Sheet” and
NedCar has its Cost Engineering Sheet (always worked out together with
Purchase). The question is who has the final say, and Exterior thinks it is  NedCar
since they are the ones who buy and pay for the things that go into final assembly.
The sequence shows that the rules are not clear enough. Exterior knows that at
present there is a meeting once a month between Cost Engineering of NedCar. The
Yellow Form and the Cost Engineering Sheet should be equal, not complementing
but equal. Then when the project controller and the cost controller of NedCar
agree that I as ST responsible have a deviation from the budgeted investment then
I will have to go to the PMG and ask for more money.
Properties does not feel concerned about this. His activities do not relate to process
cost. The sequence shows that there are problems and that we supported Charles.
Properties points out that he has similar problems with his own department (bills
for testing that components have the right properties can be surprising too).
After sales describes the sequence as a discussion over working routines. He
cannot follow it (well, he understands what they are saying) and it is obvious that
those involved “speak different languages.” Routines are not tuned yet. Volvo
introduced a new routine with this project (the Yellow Sheet” is new). There isn’t
enough time to sort things out! Nothing has been done about this since the
meeting where it popped up and it will pop up again!
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There is some work on a new manual called the DEC-process (Developing
Existing Car) but that has not got to such a detailed level yet. Once Volvo shows
clearly how it wants to work in this area NedCar can find the appropriate contact
points...
A background problem is that NedCar (almost equal to Mitsubishi) and
Mitsubishi have a different system from Volvo to document the car and its parts.
Information from Mitsubishi to NedCar can be transferred by computer, while the
transfer from the Volvo system to NedCar’s system has to be done manually (This
is done by Adam’s department). The differences in principle between the two
systems are explained.
Quality points to the fact that when Process gives a figure on final assembly
investment it could represent anything from tool repair to new packaging of
components causing new routines for waste management. It may be that people
have different perspectives or simply that they do not have an overview of the cost
structure or even that they try to hide costs. The conclusion is that we do not have
a proper agreement on ways of working between Volvo and NedCar. A minimum
requirement is that if a ST manager posits a change request he should be confident
that he will get the information necessary to make a decision.
Body when looking at this sequence started by saying that he discussed this very
issue in a small group yesterday. The problem seems to be that NedCar works in a
relay fashion while Volvo works concurrent. They want to have a cash flow that
matches the cost flow, we need money in advance to run the project. This
generates contradictions. In my area (Body) we do “moonshine” work since a year
by engaging the relevant NedCar people meeting them every second week to go
through the current status of the Body area. The new arrivals, like Charles and
Electricity, who also have several DTs located in Gothenburg (not on location in
Holland), don’t know how to manage these things. They have to do it by the book
and then they need to have process investment on the PEC document. Here Adam
is wrong the established rule is that that information must be on the PEC. The
trouble is that if there were rules and if the rules were followed.... but it doesn’t
function. What we have done is to tie us closely to purchasing and meet them face
to face. They know what we need and also what we are working on. For the STs
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with some people working out of Gothenburg.. they don’t know how to deal with
this. Sometimes the project leadership has had to give a go-ahead without the
necessary confirmation from NedCar in order not to lose time and that doesn’t
help relations. One thing is certain: if we were to work by the book here we
wouldn’t get a car out at all. It is a matter of working simultaneously with product
and process and finding the necessary access to NedCar (it should be noted that in
another sequence from the same meeting Adam informs the project that he has
dispatched a memo to NedCar top management and the local Volvo manager that
all contacts between the projects and NedCar should go through designated
window persons – the NedCar window person being Adam). Body ends his
comments by stating the you cannot have “business relations” with a production
plant.
Market Planning describes the sequence as “heavy”. It illustrates that we have a
member of the team that does not apply the same work routines as “we” do. He
describes ST responsibility in terms of technique, time, cost, while NedCar has
some other division of responsibility. The difficulty illustrated here goes both
ways and we should really sit down and come to grips with this. Market Planning
cannot understand why the process costs are not entered on the Yellow Sheets of
the PEC document. He repeats the steps that are gone through in a study initiated
by a change request, and how the summary costs are broken down to component
prices by cost engineering at NedCar to be compared with target cost. What is
needed is a reconfirmation of ST responsibility, how far does it stretch in terms of
negotiation with process? These “surprises” in the CRM meetings are nasty.
Reflecting on what he has seen happen in CRM meetings (where the market side is
represented and sometimes “underwrites” cost overruns that are justified from a
market point of view) he points out that cost are “quite often” presented as
“exclusive process costs” in project meetings. People cannot afford to wait 2-3
weeks for a response from NedCar. They try to cut corners.
The normal procedure is to make a “desk study” of a contemplated design change
and you just need to know that it is not “unfeasible” before you go any further.
NedCar does not give answers at such early stages. They demand a complete
study request (on which they can base an invoice?) before they commit their
engineering resources to a study. Such a complete request requires a lot of detail
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on other aspects of the change. NedCar is not involved on the desk study stage. Of
course Adam will react  when a “study” is presented in a PMG meeting where he
has not been asked to give an estimate of process costs! Maybe people avoid
contacting him on early stages because they know he will say no.
Interior, who is fairly new in the ST position having worked on the DT level
before, uses the word “frightening” in his description of the sequence, “and that
Adam has the stomach to come here and say ‘never mind our process costs, you
just run your project!” Interior knows somebody in NedCar who told him that
when the corresponding figures in the Mitsubishi  column are released there are
three Mitsubishi guys who really go to the bottom to check everything. In the case
of Interior he got a lump sum for the whole ST, he asked for a specification and
got a fax in Dutch, somewhat broken down but still not comprehensible on the DT
level. He asked his contact in the NedCar organisation to help and a meeting was
set up (for this morning) to get further details. It is OK to work with the
subordinates of Adam but he kind of “shields” his department. You have to be
really active to break through to the information, a good routine would be better.
Take the situation Electricity took up in the meeting. He had got some cost
information from NedCar on process consequences but final assembly cost were
delivered at the end as a surprise. It doesn’t look too professional! You cannot just
list the purchasing price for a component! It would be acceptable if NedCar
managed this 110 % well, but it wouldn’t hurt if there could be some objective
assurance that the estimates are correct.
He does not have too much experience yet, in his DT job it was mostly to exchange
one component for another without any process costs, but he thinks that this year
is the first with this lump sum budget document from NedCar for a project. It is a
good thing that his contact in NedCar  logistics helps him find the details, as a
goodwill gesture. “People in NedCar are not unwilling to help, it is the outward
face that is unwilling”.
Summary:
Two exchanges in two different car projects, some people participated in both
projects, have been presented and analysed. In the first exchange the manager of
an important sub-project that was intended to “catch up” with the main project,
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tries to “discipline” the representative of the joint venture production control
department by exposing his unwillingness to give feedback on the current
position of the sub-project. The representative, Adam, responds with
counterattack demanding “total information” before feedback can be given. The
counterattack is successful in the sense that the initiator of the exchange promises
to send the information “this week”. In the second exchange an ST manager also
tries to “lift” an issue of information feedback across the joint venture “interface”
by raising an issue while Adam is present in the meeting. Here the project
controller assists in the attack using his knowledge of the rules to establish who
has the budget power. It is obvious to everyone that he (the controller) is the one
who checks the two sets of figures before the Volvo representative on the board of
the joint venture signs the budget and releases the investment funds. These two
exchanges are representative of a type of discussion that takes place, if not in
every meeting, quite often.
In both cases there is a focused role, the one held by Adam, that is seen by other
members as the Devil’s advocate. The confrontations aim to change the rules that
constitute this role. An argument that is used in some comments is that they want
Adam (sometimes generalised to “NedCar”) to act as a “team member”. Adam’s
counter arguments suggest that the project should behave in accordance with the
standards of professionalism represented by his organisation (and lean
production). There seems to be two “team” conceptions in use and, as a
consequence, an “interface” problem. It is interesting to note that in the second
incident, where Adam may be said to be on the losing side, the controller
intervenes with “superior” knowledge of the rules of the game and the location of
power. The message is ‘if this is the kind of game you want to play I have a handle
on the kind of power that really sets the rules’. How should this situation be
understood?
First, the basic design of the experiment (Schweiger et al 1989) to determine
whether Devil’s Advocacy or Dialectical Inquiry is the best method to promote
creativity and learning is not matched by the field observations of product
development teams in an alliance setting. It is not that a “real life” situation should
be expected to conform to an experiment but it is the discovery that the frustration
aired by project members comes from the fact that this Devil’s Advocate (Adam)
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plays the game according to other rules (Garfinkel 1963). The co-operative game of
consensus-seeking concerning the best way to design a car is confronted with a
competitive game of who is in control . Garfinkel (1963) found that great energy is
expanded by participants to restore the game when its constituent rules have been
breached. The rules of the game give raise to “constituent expectancies”. It is those
constituent expectancies that binds the participants to the discipline of the game.
Consistent action under the rules generates roles (Jönsson 1998). Mutually
constituted roles form a team. There seems to be reason to draw the conclusion
that a Devil’s Advocate role serves the purpose of improving the quality of
decisions when that role is formed in the team. In this case the role is based in a
different logic (lean production) than that of the team, and it seems to stimulate, at
best, a need for rule making, which is indicated by an oscillation between different
frames of argument or different “footing” of the discussion.
Second, both initiators of the exchange in these two sequences demonstrate
frustration with “how things work” in their recent experience. In both cases Adam
explains that understood on a different footing (“total information,” and “basic
plan” respectively) the situation is obviously a consequence of project members
not conducting themselves according to the norms of lean production – and the
remedy is to change behaviour. The counter argument from the project is that their
responsibility for the design includes all cost consequences and thus feedback is
required. In the first sequence Bertrand finds himself “trapped” by his own
argument and promises to send the minutes from his meeting to Adam “this
week”. In the second sequence the controller intervenes to demonstrate that there
is a still higher hierarchical level that may be activated. In this way the oscillation
between “footing” - which game is going to be played – leaves issues
undetermined by the meeting. Goffman (1974, 1981) discusses changes in
“footing” as changes in alignment to those present in a conversation which are
signalled by speakers by “code switching” or less obtrusive markers like pitch,
volume, emphasis etc. This latter reasoning implies that the starting condition is
one of conversation as a co-operative game where there is (implicit) agreement on
the rules of the game. Both sides assume that the game is to be played within their
set of rules.
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The “solution” to the problem illustrated by the sequences was that Adam was
promoted to a higher position in his own organisation and his place in the projects
was taken by a more junior person with experience from working in both
organisation. Communication then became much easier and project members
expressed satisfaction with the new situation. Still, there were a couple of project
members that pointed out that they were not really effected by the problem with
Adam since they had their own informal channels into the appropriate people in
the NedCar organisation and could get hold of the information they needed that
way. It was the newcomers who had the problems because they thought they
could work according to the rules of the game from the parent company. But they
will learn – the hard way. In the meantime the site manager for the parent
company had set up a work party to up-date the manual for the procedures of
product development work in the alliance. Not only had the modes of interaction
with NedCar changed as a consequence of experience, but the interface with the
alliance partner needed attention. Several joint committees were always in place,
standing ones as well as ad hoc committees for specific purposes. From the
beginning there was a strong emphasis on maintaining as large a proportion as
possible of common components in the name of economies of scale. However, as
new year models were developed by both parties it is inevitable that priorities
differ. The procedure is that if either party wants to start an improvement project
(e.g., on the brake system) it is polite to ask the other party if they want to
participate, if not one party may go alone and the proportion of common parts
declines. If the deviating parts work well it has been known to happen that the
other party is allowed to join after the work has been done and then at a
negotiated price. The “point” of this comment is that there is a permanent
interface problem in alliances although it is a dynamic one, one solved interaction
problem may generate two new ones. Fence-mending and procedural
improvement are activities that require people with patience and diplomatic skills.
An attempt at a complementary analysis.
Could these situations have been dealt with differently, and if so how and why? In
order to provide an answer we need to look at the exchanges from a different
perspective. First consider whether an organisation could be understood as a
narrative. We understand action in the organisation in relation to a strategy that
lays out a series of transformations of objects of value operated by actors  (Cooren
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2000) to accomplish some intended goal or task. This strategy is a macro-story that
is broken down into tasks that form action networks (Czarniawska 1998). Each
train of action has a (emergent) narrative form that can be described by a general
narrative schema (Greimas 1987). The argument of Greimas is as follows:
There is an initial tension between subject and object that immanently structures
each narrative. There is a subject in each narrative who wants, needs, wishes for
an object. That quest translates this initial tension into a mission or project and
introduces a time dimension. The narrative contains two basic types of utterances,
those describing a state and those of doing. Value is attached to objects by
associating these two kinds of utterances. Cooren (2000, p. 69) gives an example:
“Thanks to the key that George gave him, John could open the door”. The capacity
to open the door is linked to the key. There are four modal objects linking objects
of value to action
! being able to do (pouvoir faire)
! having to do (devoir faire)
! knowing how to do (savoir faire)
! wanting to do (vouloir faire)
These modal objects, for example “being able to do”, do not have to be reduced to
physical objects but apply as well to discursive object. Greimas arrives at a
canonical narrative schema
Figure 1. Canonical form of narrative schema (from Cooren 2000, p. 71)
The four phases are illustrated by the James Bond story “Bond is asked to recover
the secret plans stolen by SPECTRE. Thanks to Q’s gadgets, he gets them back and
is rewarded by M”
Manipulation phase: M gives a directive (“having to do”) to Bond (to do = to
recover the secret plans stolen by SPECTRE). Bond accepts the mission
(commitment).
    Manipulation          Competence             Performance               Sanction
- wanting to do - being able to do         - doing                     Recognition of
- having to do - knowing how to          performance
  do
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Competence phase: Q gives Bond various gadgets (“being able to dos”) and
instructions about how to use them (“knowing how to dos”)
Performance phase: Bond gets the secret plans back from SPECTRE (the test) and
gives them back to M (gift).
Sanction phase: M rewards Bond for his heroic performance.
The organisational narrative, for example a project, is understood as well as
produced with the help of this canonical form. At each stage sub-missions can be
inserted using rhetorical devices that may secure acceptance. Actors then try to do
things with words (Austin (1962/1975). Cooren (2000) develops a more modern
version of Speech Act theory as developed by Austin and Searle (1969) with a
typology of speech acts each type with a specific set of conditions of production.
For example a commissive (a promise):
! has the illocutionary point of “committing the speaker to a future action”
! has a propositional content that represents a future course of action
! starts from the premise that the speaker is able to carry out that action
! shows that the speaker is sincere in the sense that she or he intends to carry out
the action.
It is obvious that the three last conditions (taken backwards), that the speaker
“wants to” and “is able to” carry out the future course of action described fits very
well into the canonical narrative schema given above.
Given that we have a typology of speech acts the question remains how the actor
accomplishes an “insertion” of a sub-mission into the mission narrative. In order
to be successful in such an insertion an actor must understand what discursive
objects are in circulation and in what ways they  are likely to transform other
agents and recipients. It is then necessary to realise that the act of uttering
something is an act of production of a text unit that is immediately separated from
the speaker and starts to do things to recipients and other agents as they attribute
meaning in the communicative situation that has been opened. Attribution of
relations appear in the working out of meanings of the text, if it is the boss that
makes the utterance it will be treated otherwise than if it is an underling (cf.
categorization analysis, Sacks (1992), Lepper (2000)). The text mediates between
actor and recipient and thus ties people together. Cooren (2000, p. 157), referring
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to Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), maintains that there are but two
argumentative techniques that allow the rhetorician to achieve the desired change,
persuading the other, association and dissociation. These can be illustrated by an
argument about whether a subject X has the right to do Y. The rhetorical technique
may then be to associate or link the right of X to do Y with the accepted right of
every Z to do Y by an enthymeme (or practical syllogism):
Major Premise: Every Z has the right to do Y
Minor Premise: X is a Z
Conclusion: So, X has the right to do Y.
This structure, that we know so well, must be reconstructed from the argument in
analysis. The argument is developed and performed in a way to suit the context.
The links between X and Z can be of many kinds (for example analogy).
Dissociation may be illustrated by the minor premise: “X is not a Z”. The criterion
for success for the actor is that the recipient accepts the argument and its
implications. A situation may be considered “rhetorical” if, 1) there is a
controversy, 2) if there is an audience (to be influenced) present, or 3) if there are
some constraints (a universe of beliefs, traditions, facts etc.) that the rhetorician
has to take into account when building the argument. Sometimes there may be
institutional procedures, contracts or the like, that do the persuasion silently, as it
were.
The rhetorical devices generate the discursive objects (“wanting to do” etc in
Figure 1 above) that mediate relations between speaker and recipient in an
interpretation that relates the text to con-text. A promise (“commissive”) is a
promise only if it has been understood as such by the recipient(-s) and the speech
act of the type “commissive” has the following characteristics (Cooren 2000, p. 132
ff):
! the point is that the speaker commits herself or himself to a future course of
action
! the propositional content of the text represents a future course of action of the
speaker
! the speaker is capable of carrying out the action and intends to carry it out.
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Given that the recipient, according to the sincerity condition mentioned above,
finds that it is reasonable that the speaker is competent and willing to carry out the
action (discursive objects “wanting to” and “being able to do” in Figure 1 above)
the first phases of a narrative are in place. The recipient can see a manipulation
phase (“wanting to do”) and a competence phase (“being able to do”) and can
complete the narrative from the speaker’s description of future action. Closure of
the narrative is achieved by adding the sanction phase, which will recognise the
promise as such and accept it. The text – the promise – has a quality of “restance”
(Cooren 2000, p. 123 referring to Derrida) that, for instance, may influence how the
role or identity of the speaker will develop. The text does not only do its thing
here and now, but lingers on in the organisational structures that the relation
established by the promise may contribute to, like the signature on a contract that
is constricting behaviour for a period of time.
If we look at the exchange on page 9 where Bertrand is trying to get Adam to
change his ways and, if not participate in the meetings he is regularly invited to,
give feedback on the release situation from his side regarding the new engine. The
“problem” is that Purchasing is subordinated to Adam and they have to confirm
delivery dates, prices etc. for components with suppliers before a design solution
can be declared done. The context at the moment Bertrand poses his question
(what is the situation today compared with last Friday according to you ; Bertrand
knows that the information is on Adam’s desk) is that Adam has finished his
report on the state of Production Control in relation to the project’s production
start. As usual he has requested more detailed and accurate information about the
release situation (confirmed releases form the basis for firm Production Control
Plans). As he, Adam, is leaving the head of the table after having exhorted project
members to provide better information as a basis for proper judgement by
Production Control of effects or status of the releases, Bertrand seizes the
opportunity to confront Adam. He opens a communicative situation by defining
the situation as a “question” and then gives a few background indicators (situation
last Friday, information exchange since then, persons involved) and then asks for
an “assertive” on what is the situation today (Obviously, Bertrand is signalling
that he wants Adam to answer – thus the question is a “directive”). This request
can be used to test sincerity since the conditions of satisfaction/success of a speech
act of the type assertive are:
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! that the speaker is “representing as actual a state of affairs”
! the speaker has reasons or evidence of the truth of the propositional content
! the speaker believes the propositional content
If Adam accepts to answer the question that answer must satisfy these conditions.
If his answer does not satisfy the conditions Adam will be insincere. Adam sees
the implication and refuses to answer with reference to his need to check the facts
after the meeting (this means that he is sincere in the sense that he demonstrates
his will to base his response on current facts).
Bertrand comes back with a directive/request for Adam to provide the
information today (top of page 10) and then gives a context justifying his urgent
request for current information – Adam has the habit to let things sit and upon
request tell project people “No, impossible!” at which time valuable time that
could have been used to correct things has been lost. Adam’s counter-argument is
that he cannot do anything until he has complete information – it is irrational to
plan in bits and pieces. Only when all components are in place and delivery dates
are confirmed can a plan be set , including logistics, quality check etc. So he asks
for “releases” (complete and confirmed component design changes), “total
information”, and “overview”. Bertrand responds that he does that (an “assertive”
claiming to “represent an actual state of affairs”). Adam claims that he does not
have any report on the total release situation (“actual state of affairs”). When can
he have it? Bertrand responds that he can pick that report up every GDI-meeting,
(GDI is the name of the engine project) on Tuesdays. Now we have identified the
cause of the discrepancy between the assertives about “actual states of affairs”!
The minutes can be picked up at the meetings or via the intranet system. Adam
does not go to GDI-meetings and wants the minutes sent to him. Bertrand
promises to send the minutes “this week” and then returns to the main issue.
Adam’s claim last Friday that 13 parts were problematic is not valid, Bertrand can
accept that one problem remains unsolved.... In the series of assertives in a
confrontation on who is sincere Bertrand finds himself on the retreat since Adam’s
focus on formal documents overtakes Bertrand’s focus on “real” problems in a
contest on what assertive has the best backing and thus is the best basis for a claim
to sincerity.
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This exchange illustrates that the “constitutive rules” that provides the
conventional meaning of the different types of speech acts (in this case assertives)
can be used as political instruments: If Adam does not respond properly to the
question about the current state of the project he will appear insincere before the
project and the project leader. However, what is to be considered “properly”
differs between the two main actors in the sequence. For Bertrand proper response
from Production Control (including Purchasing) is to confirm that the problem is
solved component by component because that is how you work. You have a list of
13 components with remaining “problems”, you reduce the list by solving one
problem at a time, and you need confirmation that this is also the “actual state of
affairs” for the organisation that is taking over at production start. For Adam the
crucial issue is production start which requires that all components are in place in
the right time, number and quality. The reference is to the complete list of
components and if one component is not confirmed the project is not ready for
production start. “The actual state of affairs” is that the project is not in line with
plans until all problems are solved. Adam’s counter-request is for “an overview of
the complete release situation – total information”.
It is obvious that this exchange was inconclusive and that the reason for this is that
the actors forgot a basic rhetorical principle, to align (association) the argument
with an object of value already accepted by the recipient. One such alignment
attempted by the project leader, twice on page 11, is the reference to “feedback” –
no one can object to giving feedback . Bertrand should have referred to the fact
that “total information” emerges as one detail after another is added to the list of
solved, and that Bertrand himself only has “total information” when Adam has
confirmed that the proposed solution is registered as feasible. Adam should have
spelled out that the point is to move the whole project towards production start
and that one continuously need to watch the details in terms of their contribution
to the whole. It can be claimed that both parties fail in their rhetorical undertaking
to make the other party change their ways because they fail to align their
argument with values or principles already accepted by the recipient. Acceptance
being the key factor in this case. (It should be noted that in the second exchange (p.
26 ff.) the discussion concludes with the controller referring to the formal rules of
the budget process. This is an assertive and Adam can confirm that the speaker is
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sincere and has the evidence required. This time there is an alignment of the
argument with accepted rules.)
Conclusion
This attempt at analysing the role of confrontation in project management started
out from the assumption that there is a relation between conflict (or critical
argument) and creativity (or the quality of decisions). The problem of “group
think” in a team could be avoided by building “programmed conflict” into it.
Tongue in cheek, we find a natural experiment of that kind when  production
representatives are members of a product development team. That function
(opposition to changes in project content) may be strengthened by the fact that the
production unit is a joint venture in an alliance under strict lean production cost
control. However even if  experiments by Schweiger et al  (1989) could show an
increased quality in decisions under conditions of programmed conflict we have
observed largely inconclusive effects of confrontations in two year-model projects
in the car industry. Two illustrative exchanges were analysed.
In the first situation (1998 year model of the small Volvo) the engineer in charge of
managing the added GDI engine-project to catch up with the main project is
confronting the Production Control representative to elicit better feedback support
component by component in order to be able to focus on problems rather than
wait for confirmation of whole lists of components. Adam, the Production Control
representative, admits that he is not up to date on the situation, but manages to
turn the heat around and make the GDI engineer promise to sent the minutes from
his meetings. Whatever the real intentions of Bertrand, the GDI engineer, they
seem not to have been realised. The explanation presented in the final, alternative
discussion of the paper, is that Bertrand did not align his argument with values or
principles that the recipient has already accepted. By not applying the rhetorical
device of association a “glitch” was generated. Hoopes and Postrel (1999) define a
“glitch” (from Yiddish “glitsh” – slippery area) as
“an unsatisfactory result on a multi-agent project that is directly caused or allowed
by a lack of interfunctional or interspecialty knowledge about problem
constraints” (p. 843)
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In the second example (from the 1999 model of the small Volvo) the engineer
responsible for Chassi and Installation complains about being surprised at a resent
CRM (Cost Review Meeting) about cost estimates for process costs not reported to
the project until the CRM. This is a problem since, according to Volvo norms, the
engineer in charge of a ST (System Task) is responsible for all cost consequences of
design changes and, obviously, must have all such information when taking the
decision. When the Production Control representative evokes formal rules (p. 27 “I
don’t report to DTs, not even to STs”) the controller seizes the opportunity to align
the argument with formal rules by pointing out that if the requested information is
not available, he, as assistant to one of the owner representatives on the Board of
Directors of the joint venture, will not be able to attest the cost budget of the joint
venture. However, the speaker, who raised the issue, missed the opportunity to
extract a promise of changed behaviour. What do these observations imply?
If these sequences are accepted as representative of, if not product development
projects in general, argumentation in the two car projects observed over a two year
period, the following comments may apply over a wider range of exchanges in
this kind of large projects:
1. The communicative situations opened in these efforts to achieve change by
confrontation impress the observers as “incomplete” in the sense that much con-
text is needed to complete a recipient’s understanding of the utterances.
2. As participants “complete” the situation by drawing upon relevant con-texts,
attribution of relations between actors via objects (including “discursive objects”)
seem to be highlighted initially (especially if the interpreter is included in the
relation). Spectator views of the exchange are less differentiated than the views of
those (insiders) who  are included in the narrative.
3. Closure of the exchange (or narrative) in the form of acceptance of the
implications of the utterances might be explained by the type of rhetorical device
the speaker uses to align his/her argument with values or principles already
accepted by the recipients.
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4. Acceptance is the key to the collective building/realisation of the narrative
called the project X.
However, there is always the basic problem with assumptions about
intentionality. Derrida (1977), as cited by Cooren (2000, p. 36 ff.), pointed out that
intentionality was fundamentally undecidable from the text. Because the
constitutive rules, as developed by Searle was used to determine the conventional
meaning of an utterance, those same rules could be used to “veil” real intents and
the recipient, who has no way of determining the difference. If the speaker says “I
order you to deliver a revised version of this manuscript by dawn tomorrow” with
an ironic wink, which is an iterable and repeatable form of expression, the hearer
is pointed in a direction to interpret that the speaker is not serious. In that sense
the wink “unveils” the speaker’s non-seriousness, but at the same time the hearer
is at a loss as to what the “real” intentions of the speaker are. We have a form of
indirect speech where the hearer has to work out the implications by applying
con-texts that are judged relevant. This leads us to question whether the speakers’
intentions (Bertrand’s and Charles’) in the two exchanges analysed here were
really the ones they stated; to get Adam and his department, to put more effort
into giving current feedback on process consequences of proposed design changes.
Instead the primary intention might have been  improved status for the speakers
in the team. Evidence of this is an analysis of another sequence where Charles
appeared as speaker (Jönsson & Edström, 1999a) protesting a change of time plan
negotiated by the project leader (with the alliance partner and joint venture
representatives (including Adam)). The emotions where so overwhelming that
Charles, a natural English speaker, lost his language, began stuttering, and tore the
sheet of paper where the new plan was printed. This gesture, tearing a piece of
paper, or even tearing a “virtual” piece of paper, was thereafter used occasionally
in project meetings to demonstrate protest without words. When this scene was
played back to Charles with the question “What is going on here?” his first
comment was that he was pleased that he was the one who articulated what
everybody felt. The same comment was given by other participant Charles had
said what team felt by that gesture. His goodwill in the team had improved. It
seems like the team need maintenance communication and this is best done at the
interface. By confronting that outside the coherence of the team is enhanced. But,
constructively, it is also at the interface that the most need for rule-making
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appears. The obvious consequence of the exchange on the CRM surprise in
sequence 2 (page 26 ff.) is to set up a work party to review budget procedures
concerning effects of design changes in incoming models. In this perspective the
exchange signals a need for formal rules to regulate the information flow across
the interface between two or more units with differing “rules of the game” (ways-
of-working).
Confrontation, thus, cannot be seen as a single-function remedy against the
“group think” syndrome. It  has side-effects internally in terms of maintaining,
improving, or changing team relations and roles, and it also has signalling effects
in terms of indicating a need for rule making at the interface with the
environment. Here one can see a specific role for the project controller (Jönsson &
Edström 1999b). The problem this analysis has uncovered is that there is a
problem of polyphony in communication in large projects like development of car
models. Polyphony is not only a matter of many voices speaking at the same time.
Many con-texts are evoked in interpretation of arguments and the meaning of an
utterance is only to a limited extent under the control of speaker intentions. The
rules of the game, emanating from the ways of working that different
communities bring into or in contact with the project provide a basis for the
establishment of conventional meanings (like tearing up a piece of paper means
protest in one of the projects). When the work according to a specific way of
working is hampered by communication problems confrontation may indicate
urgency (I really need this kind of information), but also team building activity as
well as an opportunity for the controller or a member of the project leadership to
initiate a rule making project. The researcher needs a longer period of close
observation to be able to discern this polyphony.
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